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Forsell: What Is the Nature of the Montana Constitution?
NOTES AND COMMENT
should be treated as if it were non-negotiable. It must be remembered, however, that this language is not technically correct. The
instrument is still negotiable, but the holder not in due course is
precluded from taking advantage of the negotiability of the instrument.
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing material
must be that the correct rule under the N I L and the Montana
statutes is that a holder not in due course of a negotiable instrument is subject to a set-off arising from a collateral transaction,
and that this is likely to be the rule that Montana will adopt.
DEAN JELLISON.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION?
A familiar constitutional doctrine declares that a state con*stitution is not a grant of, but a limitation upon, power. Inherent in this statement is the contrast that authority for Federal activity must exist within the scope of delegated powereither enumerated or implied in the Federal Constitution-whereas authority for state activity exists unless the activity be forbidden, expressly Or impliedly, by the state constitution, or the
superior Federal Constitution. State authority otherwise is plenary.
As a working principle the majority of states have -found it
unnecessary to qualify the doctrine further than to assert that
the constitution is an instrument of limitation upon legislative
authority.1 Where more fully refined the doctrine has been taken
to mean either:
(1) the constitution is a limitation upon legislative power
but a delegation of judicial and executive power, or
(2) the constitution is a limitation upon each of the departments of government.!
Relying on three cases the editors of CoRPuS JuRIs SECUNDUM present Montana as being the only state holding the latter

view." The purpose of this comment is to question our unique
stand and by consideration of the Governor's office under the
Constitution suggest what may be a less defeasible position.
From 1895 to 1916 the Montana Supreme Court had need in
'C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 70, p. 134, gives Connecticut as holding
that their legislature acts under delegated power.
2
C.J.S. Constitutional Law, 70, footnote 88.
aMont.-State ex rel. DuFresne v. Leslie, 50 P.2d 959, 100 Mont. 449, 101
A.L.R. 1329-Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission,
293 P. 294, 88 Mont. 180-Hilger v. Moore, 182 P. 477, 56 Mont. 146.
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at least nine' of the many cases involving constitutional construction to consider the nature of the Montana Constitution. The
expression of its nature, of course, varies among these cases, but
their tenor is that our constitution is a limitation upon legislative authority. The issue of each of these cases concerned legislative power; the decisions therefore did not preclude the possibility that as to the judicial and executive departments the constitution could be either one of limitation or delegation. Such
further delimination is first hinted in Northern Pacific Railway
Company vs. Mjelde,' where Justice Holloway writes, "Our Constitution is not a grant of power, but a limitation-particularly a
limitation upon legislative action." This was in 1913. In 1917
the judicial and executive departments were included within the
sweep of this characterization-and seemingly through happenstance.
The first pronouncement of this change is found in McClintock vs. City of Great Falls.! In reaching the decision Justice
Holloway commented, "Speaking generally, our Constitution is
not a grant of powers, but a limitation upon the powers which
may be exercised by the various branches of the state government." The issue concerned only legislative power. No explanation is furnished for the gratuitous extension to the judicial and
executive departments. Hillis vs. Sullivan7 is cited as authority
for the statement. While true that the Sullivan case in some
measure dealt with judicial power, the court in that case did not
find the appointment of an attendant by the district Judge to
be unwarranted because of constitutional limitation upon the
judiciary, but rather because the orderly method of appointment
prescribed by the legislature had not been followed, the statutory mode being deemed not an objectionable invasion of a
judicial function. Further the expression of the doctrine in the
Sullivan case is in its broad form, "Our Constitution is not a
grant but a limitation of power . . .," and is made not with
particular reference to the judiciary but with general reference to the historical background of the Constitution. Thus,
'State v. Hitsman, 99 Mont. 521, 44 P.2d 747 (inherent powers) ; State v.
Stewart, 53 Mont. 18, 161 P. 309 (plenary power) ; Butte & Superior
Mining Co. v. McIntyre, 71 Mont. 254, 229 P. 730 (plenary power of
legislation) ; State v. Erickson, 75 Mont, 429, 244 P. 287 (plenary power) ; State v. Dixon, 59 Mont. 59, 195 P. 841 (plenary legislative power) ;
Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 521, 33 P.2d 563 (plenary power) ; State ex rel Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.2d 637
(plenary power) ; State v. Keaster, 82 Mont. 106, 266 P. 387 (inherent
powers).
'Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Mjelde, 48 Mont. 287, 137 P. 386.
'McClintock v. City of Great Falls, 531 Mont. 221, 163 P. 99.
'Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392.
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considering the issue and the authority cited, the pronouncement
in the McClintock case is not telling.
Edwards vs. Lewis and Clark Co.! decided later in 1917
reiterates the broad expression of the doctrine expressed in the
Sullivan case, but in Hilger vs. Moore,' Justice Holloway ceases
"speaking generally" and announces, "Our State Constitution,
unlike the Constitution of the United States, is not a grant of
power or authority; but is distinctively a limitation imposed by
the people upon the several departments of state government."
The Mc~lintock case is cited as authority, but again only legislative power is in issue. However, that studied consideration may
have been given to this expression is emphasized by Justice Cooper's dissent, which concurs with this construction.
Justice Holloway, though, may have had some misgivings
about the exclusive utterances in the McClintock and Moore cases,
for in Heckman vs. Custer County," decided in 1924, we find him
saying, "So far as it operates upon the lawmaking department
of government our state Constitution is a limitation of power as
distinguished from the federal Constitution which is a grant of
power. "
But if Justice Holloway had any misgivings, they did not
influence subsequdnt utterances, for in Great Northern Utilities
Co. v. Public Service Commission," decided in 1930, we find this
declaration: "The Constitution of Montana is not a grant of
power, but rather a limitation upon powers exercised by the
several departments of the state government."
All hesitation is removed in State ex rel. Dufresne v. Leslie,"
which through error quotes the headnote from Hilger v. Moore,"
rather than the text, with this succinct result: "The state Constitution is not a grant of, but a limitation upon power exercised
by the several departments of state government." In neither the
utilitiescompany or Dufresne case was judicial or executive power in issue.
Four cases, then, have discovered the nature of the Montana
Constitution to be a limitation upon the power of each of the departments of Government. Yet, since neither executive or judicial power was in issue, the discovery in each case is by way of
dictum, and what potency it has as dictum disappears if it can
'Edwards v. Lewis and Clark County, 53 Mont 359, 165 P. 297.
'Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont. 146, 182 P. 477.
"Heckman
v. Custer County, 70 Mont. 84, 223 P. 916.
11
Great Northern Utilities Company v. Public Service Commission, 88
Mont. 180, 293 P. 294.
"State ex rel. DuFresne v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 449, 50 P.2d. 959, 101 ALl
1329.
"Supra,note 8.
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be established that any department of the state government acts
under delegated power.
With that in mind let us consider the most important of the
seven offices of the executive department, the Governor's, and
from the Constitution itself, its historical background and some
representative cases approach the nature of his power.
Sections 5 through 15 of Article VII of the Montana Constitution primarily pertain to the Governor. Collated with
Article II of the Federal Constitution devoted to the President,
the conclusion is inescapable that these Sections were modeled
after the Federal prototype. Indeed, the language of some provisions is a literal copy of the Federal constitutional language."
And, like Article II of the Federal Constitution, these sections
are cast in the affirmative language of grant rather than the
negative language of limitation which predominates in Article V
pertaining to the legislative department. No distinction in the
language of the instruments themselves could serve for holding
that although the President's powers are those delegated by the
Constitution the Governor's powers are those not forbidden by
the state Constitution. Tlhe subject matters of their powers are
substantially the same.' In fact, from the mere matching of the
applicable executive Articles of the Constitutions the finding of
comparison rather than contrast is patent.
But was the understanding of the framers of our Constitution different; did they, although using language of delegated
power, conceive of the Governor's office otherwise? The material
on this is meagre. In the Constitutional Convention we find the
only discussion of the nature of his office arising in debate over
the salary to be paid him.'
In urging a lower salary than recommended by the Committee of the Whole, Mr. Collins made this disparaging argument:
I think in the first place that the office of Governor
is more of an ornament than anything else. . . . The
routine duties of his office can be performed by his private secretary.
The basis of argument by the proponents of a larger salary
is summarized by Mr. Burleigh who had this to say:
1

'Compare this with the federal constitution (see Sections 7, 9, 10, 11,
and 12 of Article VII of the Montana Constitution).
'5Commander-in-chief of the military forces; nominates and appoints
officers; power to grant pardons; furnish information to the legislature
on the condition of the state; convene the legislature on extraordinary
occasions; power to veto bills.
5PROCEDINGS AND DEBATES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1889), pp. 442-

443.
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Now I do not believe that the salary should be fixed
so low that none but a rich man can occupy the position.
That it is a good deal of a sinecure I will admit, but I
will admit that it is a stepping stone to something higher,
for instance to the Senate of the United States or to some
other high office, and I think the Governor should have
sufficient salary here in the state to enable him to live
as a gentleman; to provide all the necessaries for the entertainment of the members of the Legislature as well as
the foreign ambassadors.
This constitutional debate hardly suggests that the Governor's power is plenary except as limited by the Constitution.
Exactly the opposite is suggested-that he acts under delegated
power.
Based on their apprehension of territorial governors our constitutional framers certainly would not conceive of a governor
having other than delegated powers. It is elementary that the
Montana Territory acted under delegated power conferred by
Congress in the Organic Act of 1864.' There is nothing in that
Act which indicates that the Governor's power is other than those
specified in it. Again in this instrument reference to his power is
in the affirmative language of grant.
The nature of the governor's office in the Territory is somewhat discussed in Territory v. Rodgers,' where the Supreme
Court was presented with this question:
If there is no express law or authority conferring on
the governor of the Territory the power to fill vacancies
by appointment, or any appointing power, as distinguished from the power to recommend, select or nominate, and appoint only after having obtained the advice
and consent of the legislative council, has the governor
the inherent executive or incidental power?
The Territorial Supreme Court answered no to this. It compared his power under the Organic Act to that of the President
of the United States under Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution of the United States and noted that the Constitution
provided for presidential interim appointments whereas the Organic Act did not, and held that, lacking that express power, the
Territorial Governor had no inherent power to fill the vacancy in
the office of the Territorial Auditor.
And this conception of the nature of his office was not singular with the framers of our Constitution. In his CONSTITUTIONAL
"Territory
2 Mont.
124, see
Territory v.
v. Lee,
Rodgers,
1 Mont.
252.p. 134.
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published just six years before our Constitutional
Convention, wd find Professor Cooley, in speaking of Legislative
Encroachments upon Executive Power, saying:
That such powers as are specially conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any other specified
officer, the legislature can not require or authorize to be
performed by any other officer or authority; and from
those duties which the constitution requires of him he
cannot be excused by law. But other powers or duties
the executive cannot exercise or assume except by legislative authority....
LIMITATIONSe

This specific quotation was used by the compilers of the
MONTANA CODE, 1895, to annotate Section 370, Paragraph 15, now
RCM 1947, Section 82-1301, Paragraph 15.'
In the ENCYLOPAEDIA OF LAW,' published 9 years after our
Constitutional Convention, and which may be taken to represent
the general understanding of the office of governor, we find:
Governors.-Historically the office of governor was
the prototype of the presidency. And it has been said
that "the chief magistrate or governor of the state bears
the same relation to the state that the president does to
the United States."
There are numerous cases involving the Governor's power.
The great bulk of them are concerned with whether the power
in issue was expressly or impliedly granted in the Constitution.
No Montana case has been found holding that the Governor has
the particular power in issue because it is not otherwise forbidden
by the Constitution. Several cases, it is true, have found that
he does not have a particular power because Constitutional construction forbids it. These cases would be flimsy footing for
inferring that had the Constitution not forbidden it, in that
event he could have asserted the power.
It was argued in In re McDonald" that when martial law
prevails the governor through the militia has the inherent power
to suspend civil processes, particularly Habeas Corpus. The court
was able to reject this as being contrary to the Constitution without the necessity of deciding whether his power be delegated or
inherent.
The suggestion of inherent power was also made in Herlihy
"COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LimIATAIoNs, 5th ed., 1883, p. 136.

2"He has such other powers and must perform such other duties as are
devolved upon him by this code, or any other law of this state."
rAMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA op LAw, 2d ed., 1898, Constitutional Law, p. 1010.
"In re McDonald, 49 Mont 454, 143 P. 947.
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v. Donohue" but apparently not seriously pressed. The court did
not directly pass on this theory, but by way of dictum did say:
The Governor is at all times amenable to the Constitution and the laws of the state. They are the charters of his powers, and in them he must find the authority for his official acts. While he may not exceed their
bounds in any instance he may invoke any remedy provided by them for the purpose whenever the exigencies
of a particular case call for it.
These cases offer little solace for believing that the Governor has other than delegated power. But a much more recent
case" is yet more significant. In defending Governor Bonner's
removal of the Chairman of the Unemployment Compensation
Commission the argument proceeded on the basis that he had been
given this power by the Act itself,' and by R.C.M. 1935, Section
422. No effort was made to find that this power existed because
it was not otherwise forbidden by the Constitution and laws
pursuant to it. This would have been an appropriate case to urge
this theory had it been believed to, exist for the power to remove
where not conferred could be said to be inherent, and not forbidden by the Constitution.
Doubt thus having been cast on the thesis that the Governor's powers are those not otherwise forbidden by the Constitution, it is tempting to discard entirely the doctrine that the Montana Constitution is one of limitation on each of the departments
of government and hold as apparently Illinois does:
The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the
legislative department of the government; but it is to be
regarded as a grant of powers to the other departments.
(a) Neither the executive nor the judiciary, therefore,
can exercise any authority or power, except such as is
clearly granted by the constitution."
Or as Wyoming apparently does:
This is elementary, and too familiar to need elaboration,
that, while the judiciary and the executive have only
enumerated powers, the sway of the legislative department is supreme, except as controlled by the limitations
imposed by the organic law.'
Both the Illinois Constitution, which was adopted in 1871,
'Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 P. 154.
"Bonner v. District Court, 122 Mont. 464, 206 P.2d. 166.
"Unemployment Compensation Law, Laws 1937, c. 137.
Il., 2 Scammon, p. 79, People v. Fields.
"85-36 P. 517, see p. 520; 4 Wyo. 535, People v. Henderson.
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and the Wyoming Constitution, which was adopted in 1889, are
very similar to ours. In each of these constitutions the articles
pertaining to the legislature are expressed in the negative language of limitation, while the articles pertaining to the executive are expressed in the affirmative language of grant.
A good case could be made for following their interpretation. But such a rule in view of our present stage in understanding the Montana Constitution is too glib to be reliable. It
seems that we can better arrive at the nature of the Montana
Constitution by a piecemeal approach. Each of the executive
offices and the court systems should be separately analyzed to
determine the nature of their particular powers. Appeals in
the offing concerning the Attorney General's power should prove
helpful. In the meantime, it would be best to return to the earlier
Montana holding that the Constitution is a limitation upon legislative authority. And almost certainly at least that much is true.
LOUIS FORSELL
MONTANA HOMESTEAD LAWS; THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO BANKRUPTCY
I.

In General: The Homestead Laws of Montana.
At the common law some exemptions from execution were
known both in England' and the United States ! but there was no
generally recognized right of homestead. The Republic of Texas
in an act dated January 26, 1839 produced the first actual legislation on the subject.! In our own state the Constitution specifies
that "the legislative assembly shall enact liberal homestead and
exemption statutes."' Subsequently laws were passed following
this general mandate' and the Supreme Court in the case of
Mitchell v. McCormick announced that the statutes then in effect
were to carry out that purpose.! The laws were enacted for the
debtor and were to be liberally construed." The needs served by
the allowance of the realty exemption are usually stated to be
security of the home, the encouragement of building the home,
attraction of people to unsettled areas, the general building up
of the community through the absence of pauperism and the con'Blackstone, III Commentaries (4th) 412 ff.
G. L., Home8tead, Exemption8, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1291.
id. Source: Laws of Texas, 3rd Congress, 1st session.
'Constitution
of the State of Montana, Art. XIX, § 4.
5
First noted in the Montana Code in 1895. But note that Montana homestead laws date from the Bannack statutes of the Sixties.
022 Mont. 249, 56 Pac. 216 (1899).
'Oregon Mfg. Co. v. Dunbar (1930) 87 Mont. 603, 289 Pac. 559.

2
8Haskins,
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